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NOTES AND COMMENTS

lower courts to apply the Tort Claims Act in a broad and liberal spirit.
The rule laid down in Dalehite v. United States would certainly have
reversed a number of the cases cited supra. However, there is perhaps
no reason to assume that the rule in the Dalehite case will be carried to
its ultimate, and logical, conclusion, namely, that the negligence of any
federal employee, however humble, and including truck drivers, will be
held to be exempt as a matter of discretion if the employee is acting under
the orders or supervision of responsible superiors who have laid down a
plan for the performance of his duties, but who, in the process, has decisions of his own to make.
Of course, in all such matters, practical considerations cannot be
entirely ignored. Two hundred million dollars is a large sum of money,
by any measure, and as a penalty for negligence it is unquestionably
immense. There is nothing to indicate that this aspect of the situation
influenced the Court, unless, translating freely, one might read such an
intimation into the closing words of Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting
opinion: "Surely a statute so long debated was meant to embrace more
than traffic accidents.23 If not, the ancient and discredited doctrine that
'The King can do no wrong' has not been uprooted; it has merely been
amended to read, 'The King can do only little wrongs.'
MILTON E. LoomIs

Privacy-Unauthorized Use of Photographs-Infringement of
Personal and Property Rights
In a recent New York case, Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps,'
plaintiff manufacturer had contracts with certain major-league ballplayers for the exclusive right to exploit the publicity value of their
photographs in advertising its products. Defendant subsequently used
the photographs of these same ballplayers in a competing merchandising
and advertising scheme. 2 In an action to secure damages and to enjoin

"' The reference here is to the stress laid in the prevailing opinion upon the preliminary hearings and debates in Congress, where the proposed legislation was described as relating to "common law" or "run-of-the-mine" torts, and where almost
the only illustration offered was that of the motor vehicle accident.
1202 F. 2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). Plaintiff had for several years been successfully
merchandising and advertising its bubble gum by using pictures of big-league ball-

players, which it obtained by exclusive contracts. Defendant, a competitor, attempted to use pictures of players under contract with plaintiff. Held, plaintiff has
a cause of action for this infringement.
I This use of a photograph is to be distinguished from "indorsement" or "testimontal" advertising. One who falsely claims an indorsement may subject himself
to sec. 43(a) of the Lanham Act where a wrongdoer in cases of false advertising
is "liable to a civil action ... by any person who believes that he is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representation." 60 STAT. 441,
15 U. S. C. § 1125(a) (1946). See CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE
MARis, § 20.2(f) (2d ed. 1950) ; Callman, FalseAdvertising as a Competitive Tort,
48 CoL. L. REv. 876, 885 (1948).
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the use of such photographs as an encroachment on plaintiff's "rights
of publicity" in these pictures, defendant argued, and the lower court so
held, that a person has no legal interest in the publication of his picture
other than his non-assignable right-of privacy, consequently, plaintiff's
contracts constituted mere releases from liability to the ballplayers for
his invasion of their privacy through use of their photographs. On
appeal the court held that under New York law ". . . in addition to and
independent of that right of privacy (which in New York derives from
statute),3 a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e.,
the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and
that such a grant may validly be made 'in gross,' i.e., without an accom'4
panying transfer of a business or of anything else."
Prior to this decision a person might prevent the unauthorized commercial publication of his name or photograph by invoking his right of
privacy. Consequently, he might "cash in" on his publicity value by the
threat of a privacy suit. Privacy, however, was developed as the personal, 6 non-assignable" right of the individual to be let alone.8 While
damages for injured feelings are a just compensation for the person who
desires seclusion, an actress who has been in the limelight and whose
feelings cannot be said to be injured by publicity can recover only nominal damages for invasion of her privacy. Although -defendant violated
the New York Privacy Statute, the plaintiff could show no loss and
N. Y. CIVL RIGHTs LAW §§ 50, 51 (1938). "Any person whose name, porN
trait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or purposes of
trade without the written consent first obtained . . . may maintain an equitable
action . . . against the person . . . so using . . . to prevent and restrain the use

thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reasons of such use. . .

."

This statute is the result of a rejection of the right of pri-

vacy at common law in Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N . Y. 538, 64
N. E. 442 (1902). North Carolina, on the other hand, recognized the common law
right of privacy in Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55
(1938) and relied on the able dissent of Judge Gray in the above New York case.
'Haelan Laboratories v. Topps, 202 F. 2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). There
being some question of defendant wrongfully inducing a breach of contract, Chief
Judge Swan concurred "... in so much of the opinion as deals with the defendant's
liability for intentionally inducing a ballplayer to breach a contract which gave a
plaintiff the exclusive privilege of using his picture."
'Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P. 2d 630 (1952) ; Kerby v. Hal
Roach Studies, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P. 2d 577 (1942) ; Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1915) ; Pallas v. Crowley, Milner Co.,
322 Mich. 411, 33 N. W. 2d 911 (1948) ; Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C.
780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) ; Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193 (1890).
'Von Thodorovich v. Franz Josef Beneficial Ass'n, 154 Fed. 911 (C. C. E. D.
Pa. 1907) ; Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P. 2d 491
(1939) ; Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1896) ; Wyatt v. Hall's
Portrait Studio, 71 Misc. 199, 128 N. Y. Supp. 247 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
Pekas Co. v. Leslie, 52 N. Y. L. J. 1864 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1915).

' Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. N. Y. 1939) ; Jones
v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. 2d 972 (1929) ; Brents v. Morgan, 221
Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927) ; Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 192 S. C. 454,
7 S. E. 2d 169 (1940).
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recovered nothing for the commercial exploitation of her name and
photograph. 9 A professional entertainer may waive his right of privacy
against the unauthorized and protested telecasting of his act to thousands
10
of non-paying onlookers because at the time he was performing publicly.
Thus, it has been submitted that privacy may be an inadequate remedy
for those who desire publicity rather than to be let alone." A "right of
publicity," however, would assure damages commensurate with the commercial value of a celebrity's name or photograph, and prior publicity
would enhance the value of the right rather than constitute a waiver of
a cause of action.
Defendant's contentions, in the principal case, that one has no legal
interest in the publication of his picture other than his right of privacy
is based on an earlier New York case' 2 where plaintiff was denied protection of his contractual rights to the exclusive use of the photographs
of certain motion picture actresses. However, specific reference was
made to the fact that the complaint was predicated on the New York
privacy statute, so the question of other rights, such as the "right of
publicity," was not before the court. Defendant's argument overlooks
the fact that a person may have a common law copyright in his photograph, 13 and that contract rights have been enforced against a photographer for the unauthorized publication of a customer's picture. 14 Doctrinally important in the Haelan case is the holding that the grant of the
exclusive privilege to use a person's photograph may validly be made "in
gross," i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or anything
else. This is in direct opposition to a Fifth Circuit ruling involving the
assignability of names of famous ballplayers, 15 which relied strongly on
'Harris v. H. S. Gossard Co., 194 App. Div. 688, 185 N. Y. Supp. 861 (1921).
Actress sued to recover damages for the unauthorized use of her name and portrait
for advertising and purposes of trade contrary to the New York Civil Rights Law.
Since her name and portrait had frequently -been published without objection on
her part and since in this case she admitted that she was not averse to the publicity
gained by such publications, and that it helped her in her profession, a verdict of
six cents was held not insufficient.
0 Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N. Y. 354, 107 N. E. 2d 485 (1952).
" Note, The Right of Privacy, 7 N. C. L. REv. 435, 438 and n. 16 (1929).
" Pekas Co. v. Leslie, 52 N. Y. L. J. 1864 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1915).
"Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 304, 309, 95 P. 2d 491, 496
(1939).
"'Myers v. Afro-American Pub. Co., Inc., 168 Misc. 429, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 223
(Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Pollard v. Photographic Co., 1889 L. R. 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888).
" Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bardsky Co., 78 F. 2d 763 (C. C. M. D. Ga.
1935). Plaintiff, a manufacturer of baseball bats, contracted with certain famous
ballplayers for the exclusive right to use their names in advertising its bats. The
bats were marked with a player's autograph, and each model became known to
purchasers by the name it bore. Defendant, a competitor, without agreements with
the players under contract with plaintiff, stamped the players' names in block letters on its bats. One ground on which the District Court granted an injunction
was that defendant's practice violated plaintiff's property right to the use of the
names. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on this ground since a player has
in his name no property right assignable in gross according to its holding. Re-
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the general rule that a trade-mark, trade name or the good will of a
business cannot be assigned apart from the business in which it is employed.16 This general rule, however, is not without exception 17 and
it has been suggested that a more sensible rule would recognize assignability where there is no likelihood of deception to the public. 18
The "right of publicity" has, by implication, been recognized in the
exclusive right of an agent to sell the indorsement of a famous designer
who attempted to breach her contract ;19 in the good name, reputation,
and good will of a hockey team which derived substantial revenues from
the licensing of genuine photographs of the team by name in feature
motion pictures ;20 and in the exclusive right to use a person's name in
a manufacturing process. 21 Other cases recognize a property right in a
person's photograph on the theory that the pecuniary value therefrom
should belong to its owner rather than to one seeking to make an unauthorized use of it.22 Where an unauthorized publication has resulted
in no injury to the personality of an individual and privacy is an inadequate remedy, some courts, by dicta, imply the possibility of recovery on
23
quasi-contract or some other legal theory.
ferring to the names of famous ballplayers the court said: "But if they be his
property in a sense, they are not vendible in gross so as to pass from purchaser to
purchaser unconnected with any trade or business. Fame is not merchandise. It
would help neither sportsmanship nor business to uphold the sale of a famous name
to the highest bidder as projperty."
" United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90 (1918) ; Everett 0. Fisk Co.
v. Fisk Teachers Agency, Inc., 3 F. 2d 7 (C. C. D. Colo. 1924) ; Detroit Creamery
Co. v. Velvet Brand I. C. Co., 187 Mich. 312, 153 N. W. 664 (1915); Falk v.
American West Indies Trading Co., 180 N. Y. 445, 73 N. E. 239 (1905).
"Uproar Co. v. Nat. Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), aff'd
as .odified, 81 F. 2d 373 (C. C. D. Mass. 1936). See note, 19 MINN. L. Rav. 477
(1935); Mahlsted v. Fugit, 79 Cal. App. 568, 180 P. 2d 777 (1947).
Note, 28 COL. L. Ray. 353, 356 (1928).
1
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917). Plaintiff, who possessed a business organization adapted to the placing of such designs
and indorsements as he might make or approve, entered into an agreement for the
exclusive right to use the name of defendant, a famous designer. Defendant attempted to break the contract by authorizing to others the use of her indorsement
on dresses, etc. Held, plaintiff had contract rights to the exclusion of defendant's
practices.
"0Madison Square Garden v. Universal Pictures, 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N. Y. S.
2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1938). For many years plaintiff granted licenses to take and
reproduce photographs of events in its arena, Madison Square Garden, for use in
motion picture news reels only, but not for use in feature films without plaintiff's
consent. Defendant, produced a feature film of plaintiff's arena and team without
permission and payment. Held, plaintiff had a property right in its reputation and
good
will which defendant had infringed.
2
'Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. v. Liebig Extract Co., 180 Fed. 688 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1910). Complainant, held, entitled to an injunction restraining defendant
from using the word "Liebig" in connection with the sale of the extract of meat,
on evidence showing without contradiction that Baron Liebig granted to complainant's predecessor in business the exclusive right to use his name in connection with
extract of meat made by his process.
" Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911); Edison v.
Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (Ch. 1907).
"3 O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F. 2d 167 (C. C. N. D. Tex. 1941) cert.
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The question of whether the "right of publicity" is recognizable, as
such, has yet to be presented in North Carolina. In Flake v. Greensboro
News Co.,24 however, a recognition of the right of privacy provided
indirect protection to one's commercial interest in his name and photograph. Certain language in the Flake case in labeling rights in a person's photograph as a "property" right; in referring to the value in one's
features as exclusively his until granted away; and in recognizing that
modern advertising techniques consider the name or photograph of some
people a valuable asset, indicates that a decision, if and when rendered,
would be substantially in accord with the principal case. It is submitted
that an action in privacy is inadequate protection to commercial interests
in personality; and, in agreement with the Haelan case, the value of this
commercial interest will be greatly diminished if, as an incident to a
purchase, a legally protectible interest is not transferred as the "right of
publicity."*
JOHN RANDOLPH INGRAM

Torts-Charitable Institutions-Liability to Paying Patients
In two recent cases' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a
charitable hospital was not liable in damages to a paying patient for
injuries caused by the negligence of employees of the hospital on the
grounds that (1) The doctrine that a charitable institution may not be
held liable to a beneficiary of a charity for the negligence of its servants
or employees if it has exercised due care in their selection and retention
is settled law in this jurisdiction and should not be lightly overruled or
whittled away by the court and (2) On the basis of authority and reasoning, no exception should be made in the rule of immunity in favor
of paying patrons of charitable institutions.
Justice Barnhill dissented saying that when a hospital charges and
receives pay for services rendered a patient, it assumes an obligation to
denied, 315 U. S. 823 (1942) ; Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162

P. 2d 133 (1945) ; Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N. Y. 354, 107 N. E. 2d 485
(1952). For illustration of the reasonableness of such recovery see Holmes, quot-

ing Readers Digest, Dec., 1941, p. 23 in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F. 2d 167,
171 n. 6 (C. C. N. D. Tex. 1941) (dissenting opinion), "Illustrative of the value

of the use of one's picture for advertising purposes, Gene Tunney says: 'While I
was training for my second fight with Jack Dempsey I was offered $15,000 to
endorse a certain brand of cigarettes. I didn't want to be rude, so, in declining, I
merely said I didn't smoke. Next day the advertising man came back with another
offer: $12,000 if I would let my picture be used with the statement that "Stinkies
must be good, because all my friends smoke them."' (This offer also was refused.)."

24212 N. C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).

The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the principal case.

74 Sup. Ct. 26

(1953).

' Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N. C. 387, 75 S. E. 2d 303 (1953);
Williams v. Union County Hospital Ass'n, 237 N. C. 395, 75 S. E. 2d 308 (1953)
(The case was first before the Supreme Court in 234 N. C. 536, 67 S. E. 2d 662
(1951)).

